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A few months after Washington's inauguration, our army numbered
a mere 672 of the 840 authorized by Congress. Today, in dramatic
contrast, the situation is this: Our armed forces number two and
a half million; every resident male is a potential member of the
peacetime armed forces; such service may occupy a minimum of
four per cent of the adult life of the average American male reaching
draft age; reserve obligations extend over ten per cent of such a
person's life; and veterans are numbered in excess of twenty-two
and a half million. When the authority of the military has such a
sweeping capacity for affecting the lives of our citizenry, the wisdom
of treating the military establishment as an enclave beyond the
reach of the civilian courts almost inevitably is drawn into question.'
INTRODUCTION
During the last twenty-five years the law of federal habeas
corpus has undergone rapid and significant development. This de-
velopment has been undergirded by the basic assumption that finality
in criminal justice is to be valued less highly than the interest in as-
suring that no person is imprisoned or deprived of his life in violation
of the Constitution. To that end the Supreme Court has steadily
chipped away at the obstacles to adjudication of constitutional claims
in federal habeas corpus proceedings. From Johnson v. Zerbst 2 in
1938, to Fay v. Noi 3 in 1963, it has been established not only that
federal habeas corpus courts have the power to consider constitutional
trial defects, but that the limiting devices on this power, such as the
exhaustion requirement, the waiver doctrine, and the "adequate
* Instructors in Law, The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful insights provided by Capt. Gary F. Taylor,
U SJA.G.; however, the authors assume all responsibility for all ideas expressed herein.
1 Warren, "The Bill of Rights and the Military," 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 181, 187-88
(1962).
2 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
a 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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state ground" concept, have been substantially circumscribed. How-
ever, this obvious concern for the constitutional rights of state and
federal civilian prisoners serves only to magnify the neglect and vacila-
tion generally shown toward the court-martial prisoner by the federal
courts. Although the federal district judge need have few, if any,
qualms about inquiring into the constitutional defects of a state or
federal conviction, if the petitioner is unfortunate enough to have
been convicted by a court-martial, that same judge is confronted with
and often confused by legal concepts that have been discarded years
before with respect to civilian prisoners. It is true that the court-
martial prisoner has a statutory right to request habeas corpus
relief.4 However, the governing standards laid down by the Supreme
Court over twelve years ago in Burns v. Wilson' are at best confusing;
at worst; they represent an abdication of the federal courts' ultimate
authority to determine and define the Constitution and the extent
of its application to all citizens, civilian and military alike.
A major purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the area
of military habeas corpus is in critical need of Supreme Court
guidance and clarification. More specifically, however, it will con-
centrate on one fundamental issue: whether the federal district courts
should have the power to make their own determination of the con-
stitutional due process issues raised by a person convicted by a
court-martial. Deliberately avoided in this article is any direct con-
4 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdic-
tions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district
court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.
(b) The Supreme Court, any justice, thereof, and any circuit judge may decline
to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the
application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdic-
tion to entertain it.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of United States or
is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of
Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the
United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States; ....
Moreover, collateral attack by habeas corpus on a military judgment has long been within
the power of the federal courts. See Gusik v. Shilder, 340 US. 128, 133 (1950), and
cases cited therein.
5 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
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sideration of the principles of exhaustion, waiver, or a possible military
equivalent of "adequate state grounds."6 Such doctrines are essentially
limiting devices on the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus and, ac-
cordingly, appear both to raise as well as cloud the more basic ques-
tion: Do the federal district courts have the power to adjudicate due
process issues with respect to courts-martial in the first place?
In a recent case, In re Stapley,7 one federal judge made an admir-
able attempt to close the habeas corpus gap between civilian and
military prisoners; however, the significance of this decision as pre-
cedent has been weakened because the government has not appealed
allowing a fresh high court decision in this area.8 On July 29, 1965,
Stapley, a private first class in the United States Army, was arraigned
and tried before a special court-martial for violation of various articles
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Not only breaches of military
orders and discipline were involved but also repeated acts of alleged
fraud in the issuance of personal checks.' When the charges were made,
Stapley, who was financially unable to retain a civilian attorney, re-
quested the appointment of a military lawyer as defense counsel. This
request was not granted. Appointed instead were a captain and a
second lieutenant, neither of whom had formal legal training or
particular knowledge of the law.' ° On the advice of his appointed
counsel Stapley pleaded guilty to all charges, including one later dis-
missed because of legal insufficiency. The court-martial accepted
Stapley's guilty plea and sentenced him to serve three months con-
finement at hard labor and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade with
a substantial forfeiture of pay. Pursuant to a pretrial agreement and
in return for Stapley's guilty plea, the convening authority later
6 For a case consideration of these problems, see, e.g., Gusik v. Shilder, 340 US. 128
(1950); Williams v. Heritage, 323 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1963); Gorko v. Commanding
Officer, Second Air Force, 314 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1963); Crigler v. United States Army,
285 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1961). See also Snedeker, "Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial
Prisoners," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 288, 293 (1953).
7 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965). But see LeBallister v. Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349
(D. Kan. 1965).
8 The Army views the principles enunciated in In re Stapley to be applicable only
to the facts of that case. See 65-30 judge Advocate Legal Service 6 (DA PAM 27-65-30).
0 Stapley was charged with absence without leave, willful disobedience, provoking
speech and gestures, uttering worthless checks, and action prejudicial to good order and
discipline. See Uniform Code of Military justice, arts. 86, 90, 117, 123a, 134, 10 US.C.
§§ 886, 890, 917, 923a, 934 (1964).
10 A military defendant has a statutory right to qualified counsel provided by the
government in a special court-martial only if the counsel for the government is similarly
qualified. See Uniform Code of Military justice art. 27, 10 US.C. § 827 (1964).
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reduced the sentence to confinement at hard labor for two months,
reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, and a comparable reduction in
the forfeiture of pay. 1
Stapley then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
local federal district court. The court determined that it possessed
the requisite power to decide on habeas corpus, the due process issue
raised by the petition. 2 It also held that the sixth amendment to the
Constitution applies to proceedings before special courts-martial. This
means that qualified counsel must be appointed to assist the accused,
at least where the charges are substantial, involve moral turpitude,
or may result in a substantial deprivation of liberty."3 The court
further held that Stapley had not been afforded adequate counsel and
accordingly ordered his release from confinement. 4
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN HABEAS CORPUS: THE EARLY
CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION
Prior to World War II, federal courts consistently limited their
habeas corpus review of court-martial convictions to questions of
jurisdiction. In Ex parte Reed,"0 the first military habeas corpus case
to reach the Supreme Court, the following limitations were stated:
The [military] court had jurisdiction over the person and the case.
It is the organism provided by law and clothed with the duty of
administering justice in this class of cases. Having had such juris-
diction, its proceedings cannot be collaterally impeached for any
mere error or irregularity, if there were such, committed within the
sphere of its authority. Its judgments, when approved as required,
rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same considera-
tions which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tri-
bunals, including as well the lowest and the highest, under like
circumstances.'0
11 A special court-martial may not set greater punishment than confinement for six
months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for six months. A bad conduct dis-
charge may not be adjudged unless a complete record of trial is maintained. Uniform Code
of Military Justice art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964). Any sentence to confinement results
in automatic reduction of enlisted defendants to the lowest enlisted grade. Uniform
Code of Military Justice art. 58a, 10 U.S.C. § 858a (1964). The convening authority has
broad powers to suspend, remit, or completely revoke the findings of the court-martial.
See Uniform Code of Military justice art. 64, 10 U.S.C. § 864 (1964).
12 In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D. Utah 1965).
13 Ibid.
14 For a consideration of the application of the sixth amendment to the military, see
United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.MA. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963); Note, "Right to
Counsel in Special Court-Martial," 50 Minn. L. Rev. 147 (1965).
15 100 US. 13 (1879).
16 Id. at 23. (Emphasis added.). Of course, it must be pointed out that prior to Ex
parte Reed, in non-habeas corpus cases, the Supreme Court viewed its jurisdiction over
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions during this period emphasized
that the scope of inquiry for federal courts was limited to whether
the court-martial was properly constituted, whether it had jurisdic-
tion over the person and the offense charged, and whether the sentence
was authorized by law. 7
This is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court, within its
defined concept of jurisdiction, completely refused to consider con-
stitutional due process arguments raised by military prisoners on
habeas corpus. In Johnson v. Sayre,8 for example, the Court con-
sidered, albeit briefly and adversely to the petitioner, the question of
the possible application of the eighth amendment to the sentence
adjudged by a court-martial:
The suggestion, in the opinion below, that the prison at Boston
is shown in evidence to be one of narrow cells and limited appliances
for comfort, and such as would seem to render confinement in it for
a long term a punishment which the law regards as cruel and
unusual, and forbidden by the Eighth Article of Amendment to the
Constitution is unsupported by anything in the record. The re-
marks of the Secretary of the Navy... cited by the learned judge,
as to the condition of the prisons at the command of the depart-
ment at that time, have no tendency to show what is the present
condition of any of those prisons. 19
Moreover, in Carter v. McClaughry,0 the Court, although affirming
the concept of limited review on habeas corpus, went to great lengths
to show that the petitioner had not been subjected to double jeopardy
within the concept of the fifth amendment. Accordingly, there is some
support for the proposition that, even in military habeas corpus cases,
the Supreme Court was not totally unwilling to consider due process
arguments within the context of whether the court-martial possessed the
requisite jurisdiction over the person and the offense and whether the
sentence was authorized by law.
During this period, similar language limiting the federal courts to
questions of jurisdiction pervades most of the Supreme Court opinions
considering habeas corpus attack on civilian criminal convictions."
courts-martial to be narrowly limited. See Ex parte Vallamdigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243
(1863); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
'7 E.g., Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922); McClaughry v. Deming, 186
U.S. 49 (1902); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S.
109 (1895); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
18 158 U.S. 109 (1895).
19 Id. at 116.
20 183 U.S. 365 (1902).
21 See, e.g., In re Gregory, 219 U.S. 210 (1911); Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442
(1910); In re Moran, 203 U.S. 96 (1906); Dimmick v. Tompkins, 194 U.S. 540 (1904);
Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 138 (1901).
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In In re Gregory,2 2 for example, a habeas corpus proceeding reviewing
a District of Columbia police court conviction, Mr. Justice Hughes,
speaking for the Court, stated clearly:
The only question before us is whether the police Court had jurisdic-
tion. A habeas corpus proceeding cannot be made to perform the
function of a writ of error and we are not concerned with the ques-
tion whether the information was sufficient or whether the acts set
forth in the agreed statement constituted a crime, that is to say,
whether the court properly applied the law, if it be found that the
court had jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the judg-
ment.2s
However, during this period the impact of this "black-letter" law was
alleviated somewhat by a limited expansion of the concept of juris-
diction. In 1889, for example, the Supreme Court allowed a petitioner
in habeas corpus to attack the jurisdiction of a federal court on grounds
of double jeopardy.24 However, most of the later deviations from the
narrow jurisdictional concept occurred in cases involving allegations
of state denial of due process. In Frank v. Mangrum25 the Court
considered but rejected on habeas corpus an allegation of a mob-
dominated Georgia trial. But the Court indicated that if the allegation
had been proved, habeas corpus relief on the basis of a violation of
the fourteenth amendment may have been available. On the other
hand in Moore v. Dempsey,26 a habeas corpus attack on an Arkansas
murder conviction, the Supreme Court ordered the federal district
judge to hold a hearing to determine whether alleged mob domination
of the trial was sufficient to render the trial "void" because of a denial
of due process. It should be noted that in Moore the Court was prob-
ably influenced by the fact that the petitioners were Negroes facing
execution and that their allegations, if true, evidenced a brutal and
shocking disregard of their constitutional rights .2 Later, in Knewel v.
Egan,28 the Court returned, albeit somewhat equivocally, to more
traditional "jurisdiction language" in considering the habeas corpus
petition of a South Dakota prisoner:
22 219 U.S. 210 (1911).
23 Id. at 213.
24 Hans Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); But cf. Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328, 330
(1885).
25 237 US. 309 (1915). For a discussion of the implications of the Frank case, see
Bator, "Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners," 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 486-93 (1963).
26 261 US. 86 (1923).
27 Id. at 87-90.
28 268 U.S. 442 (1925).
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A person convicted of crime by a judgment of a state court... may
proceed by writ of habeas corpus on constitutional grounds sum-
marily to determine whether he is restrained of his liberty by
judgment of a court acting without jurisdiction .... But ...he
may not use it as a substitute for a writ of error.
[T]he ultimate question presented is whether the procedure es-
tablished by the statutes of South Dakota ... is a denial of a con-
stitutional right. With respect to that question, we hold... that the
judgment of state courts in criminal cases will not be reviewed on
habeas corpus merely because some right under the Constitution of
the United States is alleged to have been denied to the person con-
victed.29
The traditional concepts of jurisdiction were not seriously
strained, however, at least with respect to federal convictions, until
1938, when the Court broke into substantially new habeas corpus
ground in Johnson v. Zerbst.0 The federal district court in that case
had noted that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to counsel
guaranteed by the sixth amendment, but refused to grant habeas
corpus relief because it was "not sufficient . . . to make the trial
void."3 1 The Supreme Court reversed and held that jurisdiction, al-
though present at the beginning of the trial, "may be lost in the course
of the proceedings due to failure to complete the court . . . by
providing counsel for an accused." It further ruled that if there had
been a violation of the sixth amendment, it "stands as a jurisdictional
bar to a valid conviction and sentence."32 Four years later, in Waley v.
Johnston,3 3 the Court further extended the scope of habeas corpus by
simply deciding that jurisdiction alone was no longer the sole con-
sideration. The Court concluded that the writ of habeas corpus "ex-
tends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in
disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the
writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights." 4 By 1944,
Zerbst and Waley were implicitly extended to state convictions in
House v. Mayo,3' where a prisoner sought habeas corpus relief alleging
that he was forced to plead to a burglary information without the
requested aid of counsel.
29 Id. at 445-47. But see Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
30 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
81 Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F. Supp. 253, 256 (N-D. Ga. 1935).
32 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
33 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
34 Id. at 104-05.
35 324 U.S. 42 (1945). See Hart, "The Supreme Court 1958 Term," 73 Harv. L. Rev.
84, 105 (1959).
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THE TEMPORARY EXPANSION OF MILITARY HABEAS CORPUS
Considering the history of similar limitations applicable to habeas
corpus relief in both military and civilian convictions,8 6 many district
court and court of appeals judges apparently considered it logical to
extend the protection afforded by the Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson v. Zerbst37 to court-martial convictions. The extension of
the doctrine of the Johnson case to state convictions in all likelihood
reinforced this premise.8 During the 1940's, the courts of appeals in
six circuits ruled that federal courts considering habeas corpus peti-
tions filed by military personnel convicted by courts-martial should
determine whether the petitioners' rights to fair trial and due process
were violated by the military tribunals.3 9 In each circuit the court
either traced the expansion of collateral attack and extended it to
military personnel or assumed that expansion and then determined
whether there was a constitutional violation.
In the second circuit, Judge Swan assumed that when a denial of
due process of law by a court-martial exists, the civil courts may dis-
charge a military prisoner from custody.40 Similarly, the Third Circuit
concluded that "it is open for a civil court in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing to consider whether the circumstances of a court-martial proceeding
and the manner in which it was conducted ran afoul of the basic
standard of fairness which is involved in the constitutional concept
of due process of law and if it so finds, to declare that the relator has
been deprived of his liberty in violation of the fifth amendment and
to discharge him from custody."'" The Tenth Circuit held that "a civil
court has jurisdiction in a proceeding in habeas corpus to determine
whether the sentence of the court-martial was wanting in due
process.142 Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in
reversing the denial of the writ in Schita v. King,43 referred to the
"trend of modern decisions" and ordered the district court to hear
36 See text accompanying notes 15-30 supra.
87 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
88 See supra note 35.
39 Montalvo v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 874 (1949);
Smith v. Hiatt, 170 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1948), rev'd, Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695
(1949); Benjamin v. Hunter, 169 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1948); Wrublewski v. Mclnerney,
166 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1948); United States ex rel. Weintraub v. Swenson, 165 F.2d 756
(2d Cir. 1948); United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944); Schita
v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943).
40 United States ex rel. Weintraub v. Swenson, 165 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1948).
41 United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944).
42 Benjamin v. Hunter, 169 F.2d 512, 513-14 (10th Cir. 1948).
43 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943).
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petitioner's allegations that he had been denied a fair trial.44 The
court probably intended to extend collateral attack of courts-martial
beyond the federal court standard when it admonished that "the
judgment did not carry with it the presumptions of legality and validity
which protect the judgment of a civil court of general jurisdiction
against collateral attack."45 Upon a second appeal of Schita, this time
affirming the denial of the writ, the court reiterated that a claim of
denial of due process by courts-martial justified the interference of
a federal civil court in habeas corpus proceedings. 4
It must be emphasized that during this period the courts of appeals
limited scrutinization of military tribunals on constitutional grounds
to "exceptional cases," in accord with the federal standard. 7 While
making their own determinations of the due process questions presented
in each case, the courts found the military procedure consonant with
due process and failed to order the discharge of any military prisoner
because of a denial of due process. The Supreme Court avoided the
question of due process and military tribunals by denying certiorari
in all cases where the petitioners were not discharged but where the
courts of appeals decisions were, nonetheless, based upon due process
grounds. In only one case during this decade did the Supreme Court
make its presence felt on this issue, and that case involved what was
apparently the only order by a court of appeals discharging a military
prisoner because of a denial of due process during the military proceed-
ings.4 A ruling that a pretrial investigation, which was neither
thorough nor impartial, was a violation of due process was reversed
by the Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Smith.49 The lower court's
statements concerning due process were not refuted nor discussed by
the Supreme Court, which limited its decision to the nature of the pre-
trial investigation. Finding the pretrial investigation not mandatory
under the Articles of War, Mr. Justice Black held the investigation
not to be a jurisdictional matter. Whether the Court intended the
44 Among other allegations, the petitioner, Schita, convicted by a general court-
martial in 1919, charged that representation by military counsel was not of his own
choosing, that witnesses testified in his absence, that witnesses testifying against him were
not under oath, that the petitioner and his witnesses were intimidated, and that his
civilian counsel was unprepared. The district court had ruled that these allegations were
insufficient to show a lack of jurisdiction in the court-martial. Id. at 284.
45 Id. at 287.
46 Schita v. Cox, 139 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 761, rehearing denied,
323 U.S. 810 (1944).
47 United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, supra note 41.
48 Smith v. Hiatt, 170 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1948).
49 336 U.S. 695 (1949).
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term "jurisdiction" to be construed in the narrow, technical sense or
in the broader due process connotation remains unclear from the
decision. Although Humphrey v. Smith" provided an excellent vehicle
for the Court to rule upon the nature and extent of collateral attack
of court-martial convictions, the Court, instead, chose to construe a
narrow point.5 '
One year later, in 1950, the Supreme Court intervened. 2
THE SOURCE OF THE CONFUSION
In the 1950 Supreme Court case, Hiatt v. Brown,53 it was con-
sidered error for a federal court to determine whether an individual
subject to military jurisdiction was accorded a fair trial and due
process of law. The Court did not consider the applicability of Johnson
v. Zerbst 4 but adopted a narrow rule denying servicemen the right to
attack through habeas corpus a failing of due process in court-martial
convictions. The intent of the Court was made very clear by Mr.
Justice Clark:
The Court of Appeals also concluded that certain errors committed
by the military tribunal and reviewing authorities had deprived
respondent of due process. We think the court was in error in ex-
tending its review, for the purpose of determining compliance with
the due process clause to such matters as the propositions of law
set forth in the staff judge advocate's report, the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain respondent's conviction, the adequacy of the
pretrial investigation, and the competence of the law member and
defense counsel. It is well settled that "by habeas corpus the civil
courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the proceed-
ings of a court-martial.... The single inquiry, the test, is juris-
diction."5 5
Among other irregularities in the court-martial, the court of appeals
in Hiatt found that "counsel appointed to defend the accused was in-
competent, gave no preparation to the case, and submitted only a token
defense."56 But the Supreme Court denied such "supervisory" power
to the federal courts. Mr. Justice Clark could well have quoted from
SO Ibid.
51 The same year that the Court decided Humphrey v. Smith, it specifically avoided
deciding to what extent a court-martial overruling of a plea of former jeopardy is
subject to collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,
688 n.4 (1949).
52 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 US. 103, rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 939 (1950).
53 Ibid.
54 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
55 Hiatt v. Brown, supra note 52, at 110-11. (Citations omitted.)
56 Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1949).
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the district court decision which was overruled by Johnson v. Zerbst
that the findings were not sufficient "to make the trial void and
justify its annulment in a habeas corpus proceeding, but that they
constituted trial errors or irregularities which could only be corrected
on appeal.22 7
Despite the clear import of the Supreme Court's unequivocal
language, the Tenth Circuit in Kuykendall v. Hunter5" ignored Hiatt
and applied due process considerations in a habeas corpus attack
upon a court-martial. In Kuykendall, the petitioner alleged that he was
denied due process and a fair trial by the joinder of four specifications
of rape. The court, while finding no violation of due process, did
review the petitioner's claims beyond the narrow confines of technical
jurisdiction and observed that "due process of law must be observed
in military trials the same as trials in civil courts."59
The strict approach to habeas corpus petitions arising out of
court-martial convictions was modified by the Supreme Court in
Burns v. Wilson."0 There the two petitioners alleged a denial of due
process, charging (1) that they had been illegally detained; (2) that
coerced confessions had been extorted from them; (3) that they had
been denied counsel of their choice and denied effective represen-
tation; (4) that the military had supressed evidence favorable to
petitioners, had procured perjured testimony against the petitioners,
and had interfered with the preparation of petitioners' defense; and
(5) that the trials were conducted in an atmosphere conducive to
mob violence. 61 The district court dismissed the applications without
hearing evidence and without reviewing the petitioners' allegations.
Taking a strict approach, the district court determined that once a
civil court was satisfied that the military had jurisdiction over the
petitioners at the time of trial and over the crimes with which the
petitioners were charged, it was powerless to inquire into the regularity
of the military proceedings. 2 The c9urt of appeals affirmed the judg-
ment, but it expanded the scope of review in reviewing the transcripts
of the proceedings before the military tribunals. The court explained
57 Bridwell v. Aderhold, supra note 30, at 256.
58 187 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1951).
59 Id. at S46.
60 346 U.S. 137 (1953), 52 Mich. L. Rev. 602 (1954), 27 So. Cal. L. Rev. 333 (1954),
5 Syracuse L. Rev. 116 (1953), 27 Temple L.Q. 342 (1954), 22 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 501
(1953). See also Rossman, "Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions," 39 A.BAJ. 909
(1953); "The Supreme Court, 1952 Term," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 160 (1953).
01 Burns v. Wilson, 346 US. 137, 138 (1953).
62 Dennis v. Lovett, 104 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C. 1952).
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its deviation from Hiatt v. Brown, 3 stating that when the Supreme
Court used the expression "acted within its lawful powers," it implied
a scope of review not limited to technical jurisdiction. Judge Prettyman
noted that:
(1) An accused before a court-martial is entitled to a fair trial
within due process of law concepts. (2) The responsibility for insur-
ing such fairness and for determining debatable points is upon the
military authorities, and their determinations are not reviewable by
the courts, except (3) that, in the exceptional case when a denial of
a constitutional right is so flagrant as to affect the "jurisdiction"
(i.e. the basic power) of the tribunal to render judgment, the courts
will review upon petition for habeas corpus. To support issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus the circumstances shown by the papers
before the court must so seriously affect the fundamental fairness of
the trial and the validity of the appellate and later determinations
as to deprive the military authorities of jurisdiction, i.e., of power to
act.
64
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ
but split on the question of what constitutes an appropriate standard
for review.65 The Court accepted neither of the lower courts' inter-
pretations of the scope of review of military proceedings. That no ap-
proach was acceptable to a majority of the Court lessens the value
of Burns as precedent. However, at least seven members of the Court
were in favor of a broader scope of review than the one allowed by
Hiatt v. Brown.6 6 The Court's failure was in resolving how much
broader the scope of review should be.
Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for three other members of the
Court, reiterated that the federal courts' habeas corpus review of due
process aspects of military tribunals is limited, when the military
tribunal has dealt "fully and fairly" with the petitioner's allegations.67
In the view of the Chief Justice, "it is not the duty of the civil courts
to ...reexamine and reweigh each item of evidence .... ,,61 If the
military had refused to consider the allegations made by the petitioners,
then the Vinson opinion would authorize the district court to review
them de novo.
In effect, though it establishes due process protection for the
military, the Vinson opinion would have the federal courts abdicate
their essential obligation: interpreting the appropriate constitutional
63 Supra note 52.
64 Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
65 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
66 Supra note 52.
67 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 144 (1953).
68 346 U.S. at 144.
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provision and ruling on its applicability to an instant case. The
opinion failed to explain how the federal district courts were to deter-
mine if the military tribunals accorded "fair consideration" to the
allegations. If the federal district court examines the former proceed-
ings only to determine whether the military considered the claims, as
did the Chief Justice in Burns, certainly the civil court is not ascertain-
ing whether the military accorded a "fair consideration" to those claims.
Conversely, if the civil court examines the court-martial proceedings
and military review to ascertain whether a petitioner's claims were
given "fair consideration," in accordance with the standard postulated
by the Chief Justice, the court then exceeds the scope of review
authorized by the Vinson opinion by making its own determination
of the correctness of the military's rulings on the constitutional ques-
tions."'
It is obvious that Mr. Justice Frankfurter was more perplexed by
this problem than any other member of the Court. Realizing that "the
right to invoke habeas corpus to secure freedom is not to be confined
by any a priori or technical notions of 'jurisdiction,' ,o he initially
advocated that the case be set for reargument so that the Court
would have ample time to consider all the ramifications of the
problem. Later, dissenting from the Court's refusal to grant a rehear-
ing in Burns, he clarified and expanded his position on the matter by
contending that the Court had never considered whether the doctrine
of Johnson v. Zerbst 1 should be extended to military personnel. He
determined that there was no reason that it should not. 2 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter traced the development of habeas corpus in both the
military and civilian jurisprudence. He labeled "demonstrably in-
correct" the argument that the review of the military upon an applica-
tion for habeas corpus had been traditionally narrower than the re-
view of civilian convictions.7 3
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black, dissenting,
seemingly advocated the application of the Vinson standard in that he
agreed that if the military tribunal applied the standards of due
process no service could be performed by the civilian courts rehashing
the same facts. It is obvious, however, that Douglas would modify the
Vinson standard by permitting the federal courts to consider the
69 No confusion was generated by the separate concurring opinion of Mr. justice
Minton, who sanctioned review only on the traditional narrow lines of jurisdiction. 346
U.S. at 146. Mr. justice Jackson concurred in silence, joining neither opinion.
70 346 U.S. at 148.
71 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
72 Burns v. Wilson, supra note 65, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953)'.
73 Id. at 844.
1966]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
transcripts and records to determine whether the rules of due process
have been applied. Thus the federal court would be making its own
determination of the constitutional question because "the rules which
. . . [the military] apply are constitutional rules which . . . [the
civilian courts not the military tribunals] formulate." 4
The net effect of Burns is confusion,7 confusion which the Su-
preme Court has not cleared up yet. Although Burns indicates that the
narrow standard formulated by the Court in Hiatt is no longer ap-
propriate, the extent of the new, wider scope of review remains un-
certain. Lower federal courts are without guidance from the Supreme
Court and must formulate their own standards. The result has been a
lack of uniformity and increasing uncertainty.
THE VARious INTERPRETATIONS OF BuRNs
The standards and approaches adopted by the lower federal
courts have run the gamut of possibilities. Different approaches have
been sanctioned within the same circuits. It is possible that, lacking
the guidance of the Supreme Court, the courts have adopted the ap-
proach which most easily helps them to dispose of the case before
them. Decisions are often clouded with semantical jargon. Cases
have been cited as adopting varying and conflicting approaches. All
the courts have relied upon Burns as the cornerstone for the approach
in each case, but the approaches vary substantially.
Clearly the most satisfying approach to the courts, and possibly
the only clear one, has been in cases where the court could avoid
determining the proper scope of review. In these few cases, the courts,
wary of the uncertainty, have reviewed the facts and allegations and
determined that, regardless of the applicable scope of review, the
petitioners' allegations would be insufficient.76 In Bisson v. Howard,77
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, after outlining the con-
fusion in the area,78 asserted that the allegations would not be
74 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 154 (1953).
75 See Warren, "The Bill of Rights and the Military," 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 181
(1962).
76 E.g., Burns v. Harris, 340 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1965); Kasey v. Goodwyn, 291 F.2d
174 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 959 (1962); Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272 F.2d
633 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 914 (1960); Bisson v. Howard, 224 F.2d 586
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 916 (1955).
77 Supra note 76.
78 In Bisson v. Howard the court said:
[lit is not clear whether the Supreme Court has now set down the rule that the
military courts may with finality determine all constitutionality questions of the
sort here discussed, provided they undertake to decide such issues and give full
and fair consideration to their resolution. As stated, it is not necessary for us to
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sufficient even if the court were reviewing the proceedings under the
standards set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst.9 Similarly, in Kasey v.
Goodwyn,8" where the Government had advocated adoption of the
narrow approach advocated in Burns and the petitioner contended for
the correctness of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's position, the court avoided
the whole question of the scope of review.8 '
A second equivocating and less satisfactory approach attempts
to satisfy the contradictory rationales of Hiatt and Burns. This attempt
is illustrated by Wilson v. Wilkinson, 2 in which the petitioner alleged
that he was inadequately represented by military counsel. Relying
upon Mr. Justice Clark's statement that the court of appeals in Hiatt
had erred in extending its review to the question of adequacy of
counsel, the court in Wilkinson ruled that it was not a matter open
for consideration in habeas corpus. Apparently inhibited by the
theoretical liberalization of the area by Burns, the court also stated
that the record did not sustain the petitioner's contention that counsel
was inadequate. This secondary consideration was curtly handled by
the statement: "Counsel was an attorney duly certified by the Judge
Advocate General as qualified under the requirements of Article 27(b)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the trial record shows
petitioner had a fair trial, ably represented by counsel. '83 Remaining
unanswered, of course, was the question of what the court would have
done if it had found from the record that petitioner's counsel was,
indeed, incompetent.
The third and fourth patterns have been no more satisfactory.
It has not been resolved whether the federal district court merely
should satisfy itself that the military considered the due process
questions raised by a petitioner, or whether the court should make an
independent determination of the due process questions. On its face,
the latter approach would seem to contradict the view of Chief Justice
Vinson in Burns v. Wilson.84 But that theory is, of course, erroneously
,decide whether the determination by the military board of review that no
prejudicial error voiding the trial resulted from the failure to appoint separate
counsel would be binding on a district court. We only point again to the dis-
cussion of a somewhat similar subject in Burns v. Wilson, supra. The language
there is probably broad enough to justify such a conclusion.
224 F.2d at 590.
79 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
8o 291 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 959 (1962).
81 Id. at 178.
82 129 F. Supp. 324 (M.D. Pa. 1955).
83 Id. at 326.
84 346 US. 137 (1963).
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predicated on the assumption that once the due process issue has been
raised and disposed of by a military tribunal, it has been accorded a
full and fair determination.
Within the third pattern is the great majority of cases decided
since Burns. These courts have refused to inquire into the merits of
the due process contentions raised by military prisoners. Applying the
narrow interpretation of Burns, the courts have been satisfied that
their function is exhausted once it is determined that the military
tribunals have given fair consideration to the due process conten-
tions. 5 Fair consideration in these cases has not meant that the
military's decision has been in accord with the determinations of
constitutional courts or consonant with the prevalent theory of fair
trial, but simply that the military tribunal has considered the con-
tention. 6 Moreover, the courts have failed to make their own deter-
minations in areas where the most elementary concepts of due process
85 E.g., Palomera v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1965); Reed v. Franke, 297
F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1961); Crigler v. United States Army, 285 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1961);
McKinney v. Warden, 273 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 816 (1960);
Bennet v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Thomas v. Davis 249 F.2d 232 (10th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958); Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317 (10th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 918 (1958) ; Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1955);
Bourchier v. Van Metre, 223 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 903 (1954); Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th
Cir. 1953); Dennis v. Taylor, 150 F. Supp. 597 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Bokoros v. Kearney,
144 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Tex. 1956).
86 In Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953), the court said at 487:
In other words as we understand the Burns decision, it does no more than hold
that a military court must consider questions relating to the guarantees
afforded an accused by the Constitution and when this is done, the civil courts
will not review its action.
In Sunday v. Madigan, 301 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1962), the court said at 873:
But once it has been concluded by the civil courts that the military had juris-
diction and dealt fully and fairly with all such claims, it is not open to such
courts to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence.
In Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1955), at 367:
It is sufficient to say that this ciaim was fully and carefully examined by the
Board of Review which found not only that proceeding to trial at that time was
required by military necessity but that in view of the fact that defense counsel
had had four days for preparation, the denial of the motion for continuance was
within the sound judicial discretion of the court and that there was no showing
of an abuse of that discretion.
And finally, after a finding that the military tribunal had considered the petitioner's
allegations, the court in Gordon v. Willingham, 188 F. Supp. 2 (M.D. Pa. 1960), said at 4:
Under these circumstances this Court is without jurisdiction to further inquire
into the matters asserted by petitioners as grounds for the relief sought.
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are involved: adequacy of counsel; 8 7 coerced confessions; confronta-
tion of witnesses; 9 bias on the part of the court-martial; command
control, and inflammatory and distorted publicity;90 prejudicial com-
ments by the trial counsel;"' and the denial of adequate time to prepare
a defense.2
The argument that the court-martial which allegedly deprived a
defendant of constitutional rights could not have accorded a full and
fair hearing on the matter was rejected out of hand in Easley v.
Hunter." Although it is acknowledged that the Supreme Court in
Burns stated that the constitutional guarantee of due process is mean-
ingful enough to protect soldiers as well as civilians, 4 the due process
protection granted by the civil courts under this concept of "fair
consideration" is at best negligible and, in all probability, nonexistent.
In the fourth pattern, the courts have gone beyond the strict
limitations imposed by Burns to make their own determinations of the
due process questions. There has been an apparent hesitancy on the
part of these courts to do this, and the decisions have generally been
couched in the language of the narrow approach to collateral attack.
Possibly other cases illustrating the narrow approach might have had
different results had the courts felt that a due process violation did
occur. Finding no lack of due process, the courts were free to confine
their language to endorse only a narrow approach.
The confusion is best shown by a 1960 district court decision. 5
The court initially determined that the military courts had considered
all of the petitioners' contentions. Consequently, using the language of
Burns, it stated that the civil court had no authority "to re-examine
the evidence."96 Ordered to reconsider by the court of appeals, the
judge made it clear that he had not treated the case in the cavalier
manner which the language of his original opinion perhaps indicated.
It was emphasized that the court had considered the transcript and
that the problem was one of semantics. The judge stated that, "Perhaps
87 McKinney v. Warden, 273 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 816
(1960); Bennet v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1959).
88 Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 903 (1954).
89 Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953).
90 Gordon v. Willingham, 188 F. Supp. 2 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
91 Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1957).
92 Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1955).
93 Supra note 89.
94 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953).
95 Chandler v. Markley, 191 F. Supp. 706 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
96 Id. at 707.
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the court in its entry should have said 'weigh the evidence' instead
of 're-examine the evidence.' ))97
If there is occurring a trend towards the broadening of the scope
of collateral review of a military trial to equal that available for a
civilian trial,98 that trend has been evidenced only in dictum. The
strongest statement for a broad review of military decisions, made by
Chief Judge Huxman in Sweet v. Taylor,99 concludes that:
[I] f a careful examination of the record compels a conclusion that
there is no evidence to sustain the judgment or that in fact petitioner
was not represented by an attorney, or that it must be said that
basic constitutional rights were violated, it would seem that a civil
court would have jurisdiction to grant relief because under such
circumstances it cannot be said that the reviewing military authori-
ties fairly considered these questions. 00
The following year, Judge Huxman expanded on this thesis in Richards
v. Cox,' 0' when he found that the error complained of by the petitioner
did "not constitute such a lack of due process as to give this court
jurisdiction." Unfortunately, in Richards the judge, adding confusion
to the area which he previously had begun to clarify, reverted to the
language of the narrow interpretation:
The philosophy of the Burns case is that where grave questions
have been presented and fairly considered by the military court-
martial tribunals, the law courts are without jurisdiction to review
and consider the same questions.10 2
Nevertheless, the court did review and consider the same questions.
A controversy developed in the eighth circuit, when the court of
appeals ordered a reluctant district court judge to hold a hearing to
determine whether a court-martial had disposed of the petitioner's
contentions fully and fairly.0 3 The district court, on remand, ex-
haustively reviewed the law in the area to show that its interpretation
of the narrow review was justified, but it went to pains to illustrate
that it was complying with the appellate court's directive by reviewing
the facts of the case and that petitioner had not been deprived of his
constitutional rights.1 1 The district court, however, had the oppor-
97 Ibid.
98 At least one court believes this to be the case. Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272 F.2d 633,
641 (5th Cir. 1959).
99 178 F. Supp. 456 (D. Kan. 1959).
100 Id. at 458.
1o 184 F. Supp. 107 (D. Kan. 1960).
102 Id. at 108.
103 Swisher v. United States, 326 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1964).
104 Swisher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 921 (WI). Mo. 1965).
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tunity to reaffirm its belief in the narrow standard of review when the
same petitioner several months later submitted his eighth petition for
review. 05
Prior to the most recent case, In re Stapley,108 no military
prisoner had been discharged by a federal court on purely due process
grounds. Not only did the Stapley court break with the traditional
standards, but by its result the court also invited reappraisal of the
whole area. The court unequivocally extended the protection of habeas
corpus to due process grounds when it made its own determination of
the constitutional question raised by the petitioner. Moreover, the
court cut through the haze generated by Burns (and the twelve sub-
sequent years of confusion) when it said:
That notwithstanding the limited scope of such jurisdiction, the
vindication of constitutional rights through such inquiry and rulings
in proper cases transcends ordinary limitations and affords federal
courts both the jurisdiction and the duty to inquire and rule upon
the legality of detainment of any person entitled to constitutional
protection whether in or out of military service. 07
Prior to In re Stapley, the lower federal courts, even when applying
the broad standard of "full and fair consideration" (and then finding
no violation of due process), were equivocal enough to cast doubt upon
their willingness to grant the writ when faced with a clear due process
violation. 08
THE NEED FOR REEVALUATION
It is now hardly debatable that federal district courts have broad
power via habeas corpus to make their own determination on allega-
tions by civilians of due process violations during their trial proceed-
ings.109 This power exists whether it has been achieved within the
'Or Swisher v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 182 (WD. Mo. 1965).
106 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
107 Id. at 320. It should be pointed out that Stapley did not exhaust his military
remedies before petitioning for the writ, a fact that the district court did not consider
fatal to relief in this case. Ibid. This problem is not directly considered in this article. See
text accompanying supra note 6.
108 See Burns v. Harris, 340 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1965); Swisher v. United States,
supra note 103; Gorko v. Commanding Officer, Second Air Force, 314 F.2d 858 (10th
Cir. 1963); Fisher v. Ruffner, 277 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1960); White v. Humphrey, 212
F.2d 503 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954); Richards v. Cox, supra note 101;
Sweet v. Taylor, supra note 99; United States ez rel. Atkinson v. Kish, 176 F. Supp. 820
(M.D. Pa. 1959).
109 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Note, "Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners: The Isolation Principle," 39 N.Y.UJL. Rev. 78, 79 (1964).
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concept of jurisdiction11 ° or simply because jurisdiction has proved
unworkable."' Yet, the same federal district courts, when considering
a military prisoner's habeas corpus petition, must still struggle not only
with "jurisdiction," but in addition with the limiting, yet confusing,
concept of "fair consideration." It thus seems even more appropriate
now than it did to Mr. Justice Frankfurter twelve years ago in Burns
to question the result that "a conviction by a constitutional court which
lacked due process is open to attack by habeas corpus while an
identically defective conviction when rendered by an ad hoc military
tribunal is invulnerable." ' 2
Proponents of a limited scope of habeas corpus review for
military prisoners possibly find comfort in Chief Justice Vinson's as-
sertion in Burns that "in military habeas corpus the inquiry, the scope
of matters open for review, has always been more narrow than in civil
cases."" 3 History does indeed indicate that the federal courts have
generally been hesitant to allow collateral attack on military judgments
on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction in the traditional sense." 4
Whether this hesitancy, however, was any less strongly felt with respect
to civilian convictions is, on the other hand, highly questionable. Dur-
ing the first four decades of this century the strict interpretation of
jurisdiction was to a degree softened in a few cases, usually involving
state convictions. However, it is difficult to view these deviations as
part of a trend since in other cases the Supreme Court was perfectly
content to rely on the traditional concepts of jurisdiction."' Moreover,
the Supreme Court in a very few instances actually considered due
process attacks on courts-martial.1 6 At least the pre-1938 cases in-
volving federal convictions were consistent in their reliance on a strict
interpretation of jurisdiction.117 Johnson v. Zerbst118 really represented
the "pathbreaking case" by expanding jurisdiction to include due
process defects in trial proceedings." 9 Thereafter the scope of review
rapidly expanded for civilian prisoners, yet the Supreme Court chose
not to apply Johnson v. Zerbst to military habeas corpus.
110 Cf. Longsdorf, "Habeas Corpus: A Protean Writ and Remedy," 8 F.R.D. 179,
189 (1949).
"ll See Bator, "Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 470-71 (1963).
112 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 851 (1953).
113 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953).
114 See text accompanying supra notes 15-18.
115 See text accompanying supra notes 24-28.
116 See text accompanying supra notes 18-20.
117 See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 845-46 (1953).
118 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
119 Hart, "The Supreme Court 1958 Term," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 104 (1959).
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The plurality opinion in Burns intimated that a limited scope of
review in military habeas corpus was intended by Congress when the
Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted in 1950.120 Article 76
of the Code provides that the decisions of military tribunals should be
"final" and "conclusive" and, accordingly, "binding" on the courts.2 1
This provision, in the view of at least four members of the Burns
court, means that when the military courts had dealt "fully and fairly"
with a petitioner's claims, the federal habeas corpus court could not
grant the writ simply to "reevaluate the evidence."'2 2 But the con-
gressional language of article 76 indicates that such an interpretation
may be inaccurate. According to the Armed Services Committees of
both the House and the Senate:
This article is derived from AW50(h) and is modified to conform
to terminology used in this code. Subject only to a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in Federal Court, it provides for the finality
of court-iartial proceedings and judgments.123
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Congress probably did
not intend the "finality" provision to have any effect upon the federal
courts' power in military habeas corpus cases. 24 This view is strength-
ened by the language of the Court in Gusik v. Shilder,25 that the final-
ity provision of the almost identical predecessor to article 76 did no
more than "describe the terminal point for proceedings within the
court-martial system."'126
To argue for an expansion of federal district court power in mili-
tary habeas corpus does not in any way discount the fact that the
military courts have made substantial progress in the protection of
the constitutional rights of servicemen.2 In this context it should be
noted that the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for a fairly
complete initial and appellate review of courts-martial.12' There is, in
120 Burns v. Wilson, supra note 65, at 142.
121 Uniform Code of Military justice art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964).
122 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953).
123 H.R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1949); S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 32 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
124 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 850 (1953). Apparently Chief Judge Quinn of
the Court of Military Appeals also is of the opinion that Congress did not intend to
restrict military habeas corpus to the narrow jurisdictional concept. See Quinn, "The
United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process," 35 St. John's L. Rev.
225, 228 n.9 (1961).
125 340 US. 128 (1950).
12 Id. at 132.
127 See Warren, supra note 75, at 189.
128 In short, depending on its type and the sentence adjudged, a court-martial con-
viction will be reviewed by one or more of the following agencies: the convening authority
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addition, a limited form of military collateral review in special cases. 2 9
The Uniform Code not only recognizes in statutory form many rights
guaranteed to civilians through constitutional provisions, but the Court
of Military Appeals has also expanded the statutory protections by its
own application of constitutional principles to court-martial pro-
ceedings. 180 Moreover, there is some indication that the above advances
have reduced substantially the number of applications for habeas cor-
pus by military prisoners.3 '
This progress during the past decade, however, should not be used
to rationalize the limitations of the scope of review in military habeas
corpus. The recognition by the Court of Military Appeals that service-
men have constitutional protections simply raises the further problem
of the extent to which such protection should be applied in the military
setting. That court's decision in United States v. Culp8 2 is particularly
valuable in illustrating this problem. In Culp, a Marine private had
been charged with larceny and tried by special court-martial. On the
advice of court-appointed defense counsel, who was not a lawyer,
the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a bad conduct dis-
charge, confinement at hard labor for four months, a substantial
of the court-martial or his superior in command, the Office of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, Boards of Review, the Court of Military Appeals, and the President and the Secre-
taries of the military departments. See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 59-76, 10
U.S.C. §§ 859-76 (1964). Final review of most court-martial convictions will generally
take place at one of the first three of the above-mentioned agencies. The Court of
Military Appeals automatically reviews only death sentences, convictions involving general
or flag officers, and those cases certified to it by the Judge Advocate General. See Uniform
Code of Military Justice art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964). The latter court may, however,
in its discretion accept other appeals on petition from the accused, assuming the petition
is filed by the accused within thirty days from the time he is notified of the decision of
the Board of Review. See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67(b) (3), 10 U.S.C.
§ 867(b) (3) (1964).
129 If the sentence as approved by the convening authority is death, dismissal (in the
cases of officers), dishonorable discharge, bad conduct discharge, or confinement for one
year or more, the accused may, under article 73 of the Uniform Code, petition the Judge
Advocate General for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence or fraud
on the court, and must do so, if at all, within a year of the approval of the sentence by
the convening authority. See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 73, 10 U.S.C. § 873
(1964).
180 Wiener, "Courts-]Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice II," 72
Harv. L. Rev. 266, 294 (1958). See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 28
C.M.R. 48 (1959) (fourth amendment); United States v. Kemp, 13 US.C.M.A. 89, 32
C.M.R. 89 (1962) (fifth aniendment); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.MA. 199, 33
C.M.R. 411 (1963) (sixth amendment); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.MA. 428,
29 C.M.R. 244 (1960) (sixth amendment).
131 Warren, supra note 75, at 188.
182 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
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forfeiture of pay, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The Board
of Review set the conviction aside using as one basis for their decision
the conclusion that the sixth amendment requires qualified counsel in
special courts-martial.133 The Court of Military Appeals reversed the
Board despite the fact that two of the three members of the court
agreed that the sixth amendment was applicable to courts-martial. 134
These two decided that the sixth amendment had not been violated
because in their opinion the non-lawyer officers satisfied the right to
counsel requirement with respect to special courts-martial. Yet, under
the almost identical circumstances of In re Stapley,'35 the federal
district court ruled that the sixth amendment required the appointment
of qualified counsel in the special court-martial under consideration
in that case. In fact, the court was fully aware of the decision in Culp,
since the latter case is cited in the Stapley decision."36 Although both
of the above courts recognized, in principle at least, the applicability of
a particular constitutional protection, it would be difficult indeed ex-
plaining that fact to Private Culp. Of course, neither interpretation
of the sixth amendment is necessarily correct. The conclusion must be,
however, that on constitutional problems, constitutional courts rather
than the statutory courts should provide the conclusive interpretation.
Unless the Supreme Court rejects the notion that "fair consideration"
of the constitutional issues is sufficient, it in effect abdicates at least
part of its authority to be the final arbitor of constitutional due process
questions. It has clearly refused to allow this result with respect to the
state courts.
Expansion of the scope of federal court consideration in military
habeas corpus would not necessarily portend the incorporation of
civilian due process into the military law.137 Fourteenth amendment
guarantees applicable to civilians could rather be modified to allow due
consideration for the peculiarities and unique requirements of the mili-
tary establishment. Battlefield conditions, for example, might justify
a more flexible concept of due process than would be normal in the
average civilian criminal court. What is now termed "military due
process" by the Court of Military Appeals may well be found accept-
able by the federal courts in habeas corpus.138 The essential principle
133 United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 201, 33 C.M.R. 411, 413 (1963).
134 United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C..R. 411 (1963). See also United
States v. Cutting, 14 U.S.C.MA. 347, 34 C.M.R. 127 (1964).
185 246 F. Supp. 316, 322 (D. Utah 1966).
136 Id. at 322 n.1.
137 Wiener, supra note 130, at 303.
188 But see In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D. Utah 1965). For an excellent
discussion of "military due process," see Quinn, supra note 124.
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to be stressed is simply that constitutional courts should ultimately
interpret the Constitution for all citizens, notwithstanding the possi-
bility that the interpretation may of necessity be more fluid in some
cases than in others.
Nor would an expansion of the scope necessarily lead to different
results in most habeas corpus cases taken to review court-martial
proceedings. It should be noted that the Court of Claims, which con-
siders only monetary claims rather than petitions for release from
confinement, has never been inhibited by the limitations of Burns.
Even though dealing in what might be termed an area of lesser im-
portance and significance, the Court of Claims has not adopted a free
wheeling approach but, after making its own determination of the due
process questions, has generally found the contested military procedure
consonant with the protections guaranteed by the Constitution."'3
Perhaps, it is said, an expanded scope of military habeas corpus
may adversely affect and jeopardize the "good order and discipline"
of the military. This assertion is questionable on several grounds. In
the first place, the Army has publicly recognized that the advances
made under the Uniform Code of Military Justice are reflected in the
"highest state of discipline and good order" ever achieved by the
Army.14 It may very well be that to increase the serviceman's pro-
cedural rights in the manner we suggest will actually improve morale,
and hence, discipline. Secondly, it should be emphasized that only
three of the military habeas corpus cases arising in the last decade
involved offenses which were of a peculiarly military nature. More-
over, only two of the military petitioners have been incarcerated in
stockades or similar facilities.142 The remainder were imprisoned in
federal reformatories, penitentiaries, and disciplinary barracks. There-
fore it is reasonable to conclude that most prisoners who would nor-
139 In 1947, before the Supreme Court's decision in Burns, the Court of Claims held
that the standard set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst is applicable to habeas corpus review of
courts-martial. Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947). In the subsequent
cases, the court has continued to make its own determinations of the due process questions
raised in this form of collateral attack of courts-martial. See Narum v. United States, 155
Ct. Cl. 903, 287 F.2d 897 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 848 (1961); Begalke v. United
States, 151 Ct. Cl. 707, 286 F.2d 606, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 865 (1960); Griffiths v. United
States, 147 Ct. Cl. 660, 172 F. Supp. 691, cert. denied, 361 US. 865 (1959); Krivoski v.
United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 813, 145 F. Supp. 239, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 954 (1956).
140 1960 U.S. Court of Military Appeals Ann. Rep. 4.
141 Dickensen v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1957) (unlawful communication with
the enemy); Richards v. Cox, 184 F. Supp. 107 (D. Kan. 1960) (assault with a carbine);
Fisher v. Ruffner, 277 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1960) (desertion).
142 Gorko v. Commanfding Officer, Second Air Force, 314 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1963);
In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
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mally use habeas corpus, even under an expanded scope of the writ,
are not in a position where allowing the writ would have any serious
effect on the normal routine of military life. It seems implausible that
two prisoners occupying adjoining cells in a federal penal institution,
and who were convicted of a similar offense, should not be afforded the
same consideration on a petition for the writ solely because one was
convicted by a court-martial and the other by a federal court. Cer-
tainly, habeas corpus review should not entail the examination of
every procedural and evidentiary ruling made by military courts, but
ultimately the federal courts should be able to make their own deter-
mination of alleged due process defects in court-martial proceedings.
It is argued that military law has always been "separate and
apart" from the federal law.143 The same statement might also be made
about state law. But that has not deterred the federal courts from pro-
tecting individuals convicted by state courts in violation of the due
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, the mili-
tary establishment itself is now not so clearly separated from the rest
of the American community, for, as Chief fudge Quinn of the Court of
Military Appeals has so aptly emphasized, "the points of contact be-
tween the civilian community and the Armed Forces are today so
numerous and intimate that it can be truly said that military life is
an immediate and integral part of American life."' 44 To be sure, mili-
tary law should be "separate" in the sense that it must impose certain
standards of conduct not ordinarily acceptable in civilian life if it
is to accomplish the military mission. However, the concept of "sepa-
rateness" should not be used as a legal crutch to uphold limitations
on a serviceman's procedural rights where military necessity does not
dictate such limitations.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, federal district courts in military
habeas corpus cases should possess and exercise the power to make
their own determinations on allegations of court-martial due process
violations. To grant a serviceman parity with his civilian counterpart in
a constitutional court on questions of the scope of review in habeas
corpus hardly seems unreasonable. This emphatically would not give
the federal courts the prerogative to interfere in questions of purely
military law. The federal courts could very well conclude that the cur-
rent concept of "military due process" meets the requirements of con-
143 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). See Aycock & Wurfel, Military Law
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 378 (1955).
144 Quinn, supra note 124, at 254.
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stitutional due process. Moreover, federal habeas corpus courts can
and probably should apply the various limiting devices (such as the
exhaustion requirement, the waiver theory, or a possible military equi-
valent of "adequate state grounds") at least to the extent they are
applied to state proceedings under the principles enunciated in Fay v.
Noia.45 Finally, as the quality of military justice improves, the number
of petitions for the writ by military prisoners, even under a broader
scope of review, should continue to decrease. But the important thing
is that the federal courts, as constitutional courts, should retain the
ultimate authority to determine constitutional law. This would be true
even though the need for that authority might diminish as the military
courts extend more constitutional protections to servicemen.
In any event, the case law in the twelve years since Burns is at
best confusing. Since Burns does not have a majority opinion its value
as precedent is definitely questionable. At the very least, therefore,
some clarification is obviously needed to provide the lower federal
courts with a meaningful military habeas corpus standard.
145 372 US. 391 (1963).
